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PLATO’S THEOLOGIA REVISITED
by Gerard Naddaf, York University 
SAGP meeting at New York 
December 28, 1995
A. The etymology of the word theologia
At a glance, the word theologia would appear to be quite easy to define. Like most Greek 
compounds, it should suffice to break it up into its component parts: theos and logia. Logia is 
derived from logos (the suffixe -ia in Greek denotes the names of actions and abstract substantives) 
which means first and foremost "speech." As for theos, it can be translated without ambiguity by 
God or divinity - the most common meanings in Ancient Greece. Whence the literal translation of 
theologia by "speech about God or godlike things". However, this is what one finds under the word 
theologia in most of the principal lexicons: Liddell-Scott-Jones: "Science o f things divine"; Bailly: 
"Recherche sur la divinité, théologie"; Pape: "Untersuchung über Gott u. göttliche Dinge"; Ast: 
"Ratio de deo dicendi vel deum adumbrandi"; H. Estienne: "Sermo aut dissertatio de Deo rebusve 
divinis".
So why translate -logia by "science" or "research"? The answer is quite simple, but generally 
passed over in silence. If the suffix -logia is derived from logos, logos is cognate with the verb 
legein which, in turn, is derived from the root *leg. The fundamental meaning o f this root is that 
o f "gathering," "picking up," "choosing".1 In sum, legein was not originally a saying verb,2 but a 
word which translated the activity and laws of the mind.3 If legein was later to become a saying 
verb, this was due to its figurative meaning of "recounting, telling over, reckoning up" - one o f the 
essential aspects o f the verb "say".4 However, and this is the point I wish to make, contrary to 
legein, logos retained in Attic Greek the rational values of the root *leg- with the meanings 
"account, reason" and applied them to the concept o f speech.5 This explains why despite the 
numerous meanings that the word logos was to take following this, one can reduce them to two:
1 On this point, see P. Chantraine, Dictionnare étymologique de la langue grecque, Paris: 
Klincksieck, 1968-1980, vol. III, 625
2 The first occurrence of legein as a "saying" verb is found in Hesiod, Theogony, 27.
3 Cf.H. Fournier, Les Verbes "dire” en grec ancien. Exemple de conjugaison supplétive, Paris: 
Klincksieck, 1946, 53.
4 This explains why legein already appears in Homer in the sense o f "saying, speaking" and 
especially "recounting". On this point, cf. Fournier (1946,217).
5 Nowhere is this more evident, I believe, than in Heraclitus: where the word logos can designate 
simultaneously the intelligent speech o f men and the intelligently ordered and structured speech of 
the universe. For and interesting analysis o f the concept o f logos in Heraclitus, cf. Michel Fattal, 
"Le logos dHéraclite: un essai de traduction," Revue des Etudes Grecques 99, 1986,142-152.
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speech and reason. Since the first is subjected to the second, this explains why theologia could take 
on the sense of "science, research or rational discourse" about "god or divine things".
B. The first occurrence of theologia: the debate
According to the five major lexicons cited above, the word theologia is attested for the first 
time in Plato's Republic II, 379 a 5-6: hoi tupoi peri theologias, and the consensus is that it is 
employed here in the sense o f a "rational discourse on divine things." Indeed, according to W. 
Jaeger,6 the word was here coined especially ad hoc by Plato to support the introduction o f a new 
doctrine which resulted from a conflict between the mythical tradition and the natural (rational) 
approach to the problem of God.7 8In sum, for Jaeger, the word theologia designates what Aristotle 
was later to call theologïkëor "first philosophy" (hêprôtêphilosophia)8 - whence his translation of 
hoi tupoi peri theologias by "outlines of theology."
V. Goldschmied,9 for his part, in an illuminating article entitled "Theologia" will have
6 W. Jaeger, The Theology o f the Early Greek Philosophers, Oxford, 1947, 4-13.
7 In sum, according to Jaeger, Plato was not only the greatest of all classical theologians, but the 
one without whom neither the name nor the subject would have existed. Paideia: The Ideals o f 
Greek Culture, Oxford, 1939-1995, vol.2, 414.
8 "Both in the Republic and the Laws Plato's philosophy appears, at its highest level, as theology 
in this sense. Thereafter every system of Greek philosophy (save only the Sceptic) culminated in 
theology, and we can distinguish a Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean, Stoic, Neopythagorean, and 
Neoplatonic theology." Ibid.
Aristotle, for his part, employs the terms theologos, theologia and theologein to designate the 
activity o f the poets as opposed to the philosophical speculations o f the phusikoi (eg. 
Metaph. 1075b26; Meteor. 353a34-b5). Although Aristotle's usé o f the term theologikë may very 
well indicate that he wants to distance himself from the theology o f the poets, this in no way implies 
that Plato's use o f the word theologia does not designate a "science o f things divine." Indeed, the 
two approaches are radically different. Further, a study o f the occurrences o f theologia and its 
derivatives (even a rapid consultation of the Greek-English Lexicon and the Patristic Greek Lexicon 
would suffice) reveals that they went through the whole o f antiquity with the same double meaning, 
that is, synonymously with "first philosophy" or "mythology."
9 V. Goldschmidt, "Theologia"[1949] in Questions platoniciennes, Paris, 1970, 141-72. 
Goldschmidt's position is defended by G. Vlastos, "Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek 
Thought" (1952], in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, vol. I, London, 1970, pp. 92-129. In a purely 
historical study which appeared the same year as Goldschmidt’s, Festugière reached a similar 
conclusion (La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II: Le Dieu Cosmique [1949], Paris, 1983, 
Appendice III "Pour l'histoire du mot th e o lo g ia 598-605).
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nothing to do with such a contention.10 1He argues (convincingly) that the word theologia here used 
by Plato means nothing more than a species of muthologia.11 Furthermore, he brings to the fore 
earlier evidence to make it plausible that the classification implied: gods, daemons, héros, and life 
after d eath ,12 and that perhaps the term itself also antedate Plato’s use o f it here.13
Meanwhile, if  the principal lexicons14 certainly agree with Jaeger, that is, theologia bears 
the sense of'science of divine things,’ the vast majority o f contemporary translators,15 for their part, 
would follow Goldschmidt in taking theologia as either the equivalent to muthologia or a species 
of it.
The indecisiveness or insolubility o f the debate is reflected in the authoritative articles on 
"theology" in the most recent editions of primary encyclopaedias in English and French: the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica and in the Encyclopaedia Universalis. The author o f the English article 
obviously sides with Goldschmidt16 while the author o f the French article, with Jaeger.17
10 According to Goldschmidt, what we generally understand by theology is nowhere to be found 
in Plato: "Il ne peut y avoir dans le platonisme, ni théologie, ni preuve de l'existence de Dieu..." La 
religion de Platon, Paris, 1949, 148.
11 As Goldschmidt points out (147), Marcianius (T.) goes so far as to propose the gloss 
muthologia in place of theologia.
12 Republic II 377e-III 392c. They are grouped together at Republic III, 39le i  l-392a9. Although 
this paper will focus on the first species, theoi, there is no reason to believe that what is valid for 
one would not be valid for the others.
13 The fact that this list may have antedated Plato's use of it here, as Goldschmidt contents, is, for 
the case at hand, irrelevant.
14 In his post 1949 historical lexicon o f Greek philosophical terms (Greek Philosophical Terms, 
New York, 1967,193), F.E. Peters translates theologia in this passage as "accounts about the gods, 
myth," thus siding with Goldschmidt.
15 O f course, it isn't always possible to know if  the translators have been influejnced by the 
debate. Here is a short list o f the how a certain number of contemporary (post - 1949) translators 
have translated the phrase in question: hoi tupoi peri theologias tines an eien. D. Lee: "What are the 
lines on which our poets must work when they deal with the gods?"; A. Richards, "But o f the gods 
what is to be said?"; A. Bloom, "What would the models for speech about the gods be?"; G.M.A. 
Grube, "What would be the general lines about the gods?"; R. Waterfield: "What are these guidelines 
for talking about the gods?"; E. Chambiy, " Quels sont ces modèles qu'il faut suivre pour parler des 
dieux?"; L. Robin, " Quelles peuvent être, quand on traite les dieux, les formes appropriées?"; R. 
Rufenen, " Aber nun eben diese Richtlinien fur die Götterlehre -  welche waren das?"
16 "The Greek philosopher Plato..., with whom the concept emerges for the first time, associated 
with the term theology a polemical intention.... For Plato theology described the mythical, which
In view o f the importance of the concept of theologia in the Western tradition - it is often 
used synonymously with philosophia -, I believe it merits another analysis. Indeed, nothing, to my 
knowledge, has been written on this important passage since the insightful and polemical article by 
V. Goldschmidt in 1949.17 8 The aim o f this paper is to show that the word theologia in this passage 
of the Republic can mean 'science o f things divine' pace Goldschmidt and his followers, but not in 
the context of natural philosophy as Jaeger seems to imply. The most important thing is to determine 
whether the element -logia should be translated as 'science' or 'speech', that is, whether Plato is 
making a value judgement about theos.
C. Context
The passage in question is found in the context o f the education o f the future guardians
he allowed may have a temporal pedagogical significance that is beneficial to the state but is to be 
cleansed from all offensive and abstruse elements with the help o f political legislation". H. 
Thielicke, "Theology," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago (15th ed), 1974-1992, vol.28, 608.
17 "Le mot 'théologie' appartient au grec classique, et c'est Platon qui fut le premier à l'utiliser 
pour désigner la recherche de Dieu ou des dieux par la voie de logos (Rép. II, 379a 5-6). En fait, il 
prenait ses distances par rapport aux discours mythiques des poètes (les premiers théologiens) pour 
instaurer en Occident la théologie comme approche rationnelle du problème de Dieu". C. Greffré, 
"théologie," Encyclopaedia Universalis, Paris (rev ed), 1990-1993, vol.22,489.
18 G. Vlastos in his article "Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek Thought," 1970,98, η. 22 
draws a conclusion similar to (but quite independant of) that o f Goldschmidt. However, Vlastos' 
analysis o f the passage lacks depth and ignores what follows. Further, he puts the accent on 
compounds with -logos (eg. theologos) and not -logia (theologia). Indeed, according to Vlastos, 
there are no examples prior to Plato of Greek compounds ending in -logia in the sense of a scientific 
or rational discourse focusing on the first term. However, astrologia and meteorología are two 
obvious examples of this; cf. E. Laroche, "Les noms grecs de l'astronomie," Revue de philologie, 20, 
1946, 118-123 and C. Gaudin,"Remarque sur la 'météorologie' chez Platon," Revue des études 
anciennes 72,1970,332-343. For one obvious example in Plato, see his use o f muthologia at Critias 
110a. For an interesting discussion o f this passage, cf. L. Brisson, Platon, les mots et les mythes 
[1982], Paris (2nd ed.), 1994, 189-19Ö. D. Babut, in his book La Religion des philosophes grecs, 
Paris, 1974, 84-88, draws a conclusion similar to my own. Ironically, however, in his discussion 
o f the passage in question, he does not mention the debate even though he does cite the works o f 
the author in question. My observation that no one has replied "directly" to Goldschmidt (I do not 
include those who adopt one position or the other without holding that their own position has been 
challenged) is based on the Luc Brisson's and H. Chemiss' Platonic bibliographes in Lustrum 
4(1959), 5(1960), 20(1977), 25(1983), 30 1988), 35(1993).
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(phulakes) o f the state.19 Plato has just discussed the qualities required to be a "professional" 
guardian20 and now turns to how they should be raised and educated within the framework o f the 
ideal state.21
Indeed the primary question is the following: how is one to mold the character o f a guardian 
who is gentle, spirited and philosophical22 by means o f traditional education?23
Since Plato is convinced that a child's character is molded from the earliest age,24 he begins 
with a discussion o f the first instance o f a child's education: stories (logoi)25
According to Plato, there are two kinds o f logoi, one true («aléthés) and the other fictitious 
(pseudës).26 The fictitious kind o f logoi are called muthoi27 and it is these to which children are at
19 Indeed the primary or initial education for every future member of the state. The philosopher 
kings have not yet entered into the picture.
20 Rep. II, 375a-376c.
21 Rep. II 376 d 11 - e 1. Or to be more precise, within the context o f how justice and injustice 
originate in the state (dikaiosunête kai adikian tina tropon enpolei gignetai; Republic Π 376 d 2-3).
22 Rep. I I 374 e - 376 c. Although the words philosophia andphilosophos are employed by Plato 
in Rep. Π to IV in a moral rather than an intellectual sense(which begins to predominate at Rep. V, 
473b), it must be remembered that without the initial molding o f the moral character o f the 
individual, the intellectual molding, strictly speaking, would be futile. However, it is important to 
note for the case at hand, that it is only a philosopher who can mold, thanks to his knowledge o f the 
forms, the moral character of the individual.
23 Rep. II, 376e. What Plato understands by traditional education o rpaideia runs from Republic 
II 376e to Republic III 412b and consists o f two things.mousikê for the soul and gymnastics for the 
body. The section on mousikê runs from 376e to 403c and the section on gymnastics, from 403c to 
416b. Although the second must be subordinated to the first, there must be a complete harmony 
between the two (41 l e-412a). It is worth noting in passing that what Plato understands by mousikê 
are the arts over which the nine Muses preside. However, his focus is restricted to the learning and 
reciting of epic and dramatic poetry.
24 This is reiterated and developed in the Laws, notably in Books I and Π.
25 In sum, narratives in poetry or prose o f any sort. I should note that while I am here translating 
logoi by ''stories,'' ''discourses'' may be more appropriate. For a detailed analysis o f this section, cf. 
Brisson (1994).
26 Rep. II 376el2
27 Rep.ll 377a5.
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first exposed.28 Now, since a child cannot yet distinguish fact from fiction with respect to muthoi, 
the first business o f education is to supervise the production o f muthoi (tois muthopoiois, 377bl Ι ­
οί), that is, to determine which muthoi are suitable and which are not.29 Plato continues that most 
muthoi currently related by mothers and nurses would have to be rejected. Queried by Adeimantus 
as to which muthoi (stories) he is referring, Plato replies that it is essentially to those o f Homer and 
Hesiod.30 They must be rejected and/or reformed because they grossly misrepresent the true nature 
of the gods and heroes.31 Indeed, the poets portray the gods as being jealous, vengeful, quarrelsome, 
adulterous etc.,32 whereas it is imperative that the first stories that a child hears be those that will 
encourage virtue o f the highest order.33
It is worth remembering here that the reason why Plato is so preoccupied with the moral and 
"theological" side o f the poets is because they provided the ordinary Greeks with their moral and 
"theological" concepts. Indeed, the "poetic" gods were seen as the models to follow, and this is 
precisely the problem he wants to address. Consequently, when queried by Adeimantus as to what 
these muthoi should be, Socrates replies that they are currently acting as founders o f a city (oikistai 
poleos) and founders o f a city are not required to produce stories {poiéteon muthous), but only to 
provide the molds (tupoi) for those who do, namely, the poets (poiëtai).34 Adeimantus agrees, but 
wants to know: "What are the molds that must be followed when discoursing about the gods?" (hoi
This is the context in which the first occurrence o f theologia appears and what follows 
should leave little doubt that theologia should be understood as "science o f things divine," that is,
28 Rep.U yn?il. According to Plato's definition of logos at Theaetetus 206dl-2 ("the expression 
o f one's thought by means o f vocal sound with names and verbs" [Comford's translation]), any 
muthos is also a logos. Plato does not however seem to include all types o f logoi here. Indeed, the 
context forbids us from also including logos in the sense o f an "argumentative discourse." 
Otherwise, Plato would not have concluded the section on mousikë with: "we have now exhausted 
the part of mousikés relative to logous te kai muthous" (398b7-9). This explains why the word 
"stories" is an appropriate translation of logoi at 3 7 6 e l0 ,12. It is also worth noting at this point that 
Plato's aim, as we shall see, is to turn the false muthoi into true ones.
29 Indeed, Plato is o f the opinion, as we shall see, that muthoi can be "true" as well as "false."
30 R ep li 377d.
31 Rep.U 377e.
32 Rep.U 377e-378d. Much o f Plato's critique with respect to Homer and Hesiod has often, and 
rightly so, been compared with that of the 6th century B.C. philosopher-poet, Xenophanes.
33 Rep.U 378e.
34 Rep.U 378e7-379a4.
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"rational discourse about the gods". Indeed, the molds (tupoi)35 that the poet must follow when 
composing mythical discourses (muthoi) relative to the gods (peri theologias) are the tupoi that the 
founder o f the city or philosopher would have determined following his contemplation o f the 
intelligible world.36
Consequently, when Plato tells us that the tupoi that must be followed with respect to God 
(theos) must represent God as he really is (hoios tunchanei ho theos ön, 379a7-9), he means by this 
that the traditional gods must conform to an "ideal model," that is, an "intelligible form." This may 
explain why these tupoi are later called laws (nom oif7- laws from which the poets must not deviate. 
Plato gives us two examples o f these which are crucial for the present debate: 1) God is absolutely 
good and therefore can only be the cause o f good things; 382) God is absolutely perfect and therefore 
is immutable.39
It is obvious that these molds are derived directly from an analysis o f the intelligible form 
of god.40 Indeed, God (or the gods) is described as good (agathos, 379bl, c2), cause o f good (aition 
tön agathon, 380c9-10), beneficial because good (öphehmon to agathon, 379M2), true (alëthes.
35 Tupos is being translated as "mold," that is, an "empty mold" as opposed to the apotupoma or 
"impression in relief." This explanation is given by A. Diès in his translation o f Theaetetus: Les 
Belles Lettres, 236. On the meaning of tupos, cf. G. Roux, "Le sens de TUPOS" Revue des études 
grecques, 63, 1961, 5-14.
36 Indeed, as Festugière points out, the characteristics that Plato attributes to his gods are similar 
to those he attributes elsewhere to the forms, notably, simplicity, immutability, and intelligibility. 
Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon, Paris (3rd ed.), 1967, 96-97, 102-103. Ironically, 
Festugière still maintains that theologia in the passage in question is synonomous with muthologia. 
Cf. above n. 9.
37 Cf. Republic II 380c5,7,dl, 383c7. Note that in the Laws, the laws are to be used the real 
catechism of the state (VII 81 lc-d) and any other literature, prose or poetry, written or unwritten, 
must conform to it. On the possibility of these laws being put to music and sung, cf. G.R. Morrow, 
Plato's Cretan City, Princeton, 1960, 340 ff.
38 According to the first law, if  God is absolutely good, then he cannot, contrary to popular 
opinion, be the cause of all things. Consequently, Homer and the other poets are wrong to represent 
Zeus and the other gods as alloting a mixture of both good and evil. If mortals are punished by the 
gods, it can only be because o f justice (Rep.Ii, 379c-380c).
39 According to the second law, if God is absolutely perfect, then he cannot, contrary to popular 
opinion, change his proper form to deceive others. Consequently, Homer and the other poets are 
wrong to portray the gods as being protean and deceitful in word and deed (Rep.Π, 380d-383c).
40 Goldschmidt's contention that "il est inutile de soulever ici la question de savoir si Platon, dans 
ces exigences dont découlent les tupoi, a voulu nous livrer une théologie authentique," is ridiculous 
for to reply to these demands indicates if  the discourse can be qualified as rational or not.
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382el 1), simple (haplous, 380d5), perfect (<aristos, 381c8), absolutely perfect (pantéi arista echei, 
381b4), absolutely perfect and true (komidéi...haplous kai alèthës, 382el0), most beautiful and best 
(kallistos kai aristos, 381c8), immutable (hekastos autôn menei haplôs en téi hautou morphêi, 
381c9). In sum, gods can be truly or falsely represented because they are nooumena (intelligible 
entities) and not horamena (visible entities).41 Indeed, it is in apprehending intelligible entities that 
the mind (nous) is most capable o f attaining truth (alëtheia)42
If  such is the case the suffix -logia in theologia is used by Plato to suggest a "rational 
argument or speech" which focuses on the first term: theos (or theoi). Whence theologia as "science 
o f things divine".
D. Theologia and mimesis
Since the communication o f a myth for Plato is always involves a mimesis, 4 3  and since we 
now know that gods can be truly or falsely represented, that is, that there can be true or false mut hoi, 
it is important to take a closer look at Plato’s conception of mimésis.
As Comford notes, the Greek schoolboy, when reciting Homer, "was expected to throw 
him self into the story and deliver the speeches with the tones and gestures o f an actor."44 But he 
went further than just imitate the character, he went so far as to represent or embody the character.45 
Poetry (poiésis), o f course, is the imitative art (imimétikê), par excellence.46 47And this also, indeed 
more so, has its dangers, as Plato makes abundantly clear when he turns from the content (logos)41
41 For the distinction between nooumena and horamena, cf. Rep. VI, 50813-c2. Christopher Gill 
makes a similar observation in his article "The Genre o f the Atlantis Story," Classical Philology, 
72,1977,290.
42 Cf.Rep. VI, 508d4-9, 51 Id6-e4.
43 According to Plato, all mousikê is imitative and representative (Laws II, 668a6; cf. Laws II 
668b 10. For an excellent analysis o f the subject, cf. J.-P. Vemant, "Image et apparence dans la 
théorie platonicienne de la mimésis," Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique, 2, 1975, 133- 
160; reprinted under the title "Naissance d'images," in Religions, histoires, raisons, Paris, 1979,105- 
137. For what follows, it is worth noting that the word mimesis covers both imitation and 
representation. Indeed, any artistic creation is considered a mimésis.
44 F.M. Comford, The Republic' o f Plato, London, 1941, 80.
45 Ibid.
46 Aristotle states in his Poetics ch. I that mimésis is precisely what the different kinds o f poetry 
have in common.
*
47 Rep. II 376e-392c.
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to the form or way o f expressing the content (lexis).* 49
Poetry is not simply indirect speech or narrative (diëgêsis) which, in Plato's eyes, is bad 
enough since a child cannot distinguish fact from fiction, but also, and above all, imitation or 
representation (mimesis), that is, a form of direct speech.49 If  Plato sees narration (dïêgësis) as less 
harmful than imitation, it is because in the case o f narration there is no confusion between the 
narrator and what is sa id ,50 whereas in the case o f imitation the narrator delivers a speech as if  he 
were someone else. That is, he assimilates himself through his expression ( te w ) to the point that 
he represents or personifies (mimeisthai) the character speaking in both thoughts and feelings.51
Since Plato is o f the opinion that we should try, in our activity, to assimilate to God as much 
as possible,52 one would think that the expressive, that is mimetic, aspect o f poetry and myth-telling 
should also be able to conform to the philosopher's model and corresponding tupoi with regard to 
God.
Now although Plato believes that with respect to poetry in general and myth-telling in 
particular, it is impossible to separate narration from imitation,53 this is not why he believes that the 
poets must be banned from the ideal city . They must be banished from the ideal city because poetry 
and myth-telling engage in "multiple representations" (polla mimësetai, 395a2),54and are incapable 
of doing otherwise.55 Further, since Plato assumes that one can become like the characters one acts, 
then it would be bad for the future guardians to take part in representations other than those suitable 
to their profession.56 Furthermore, since it was agreed from the outset that each citizen should
4- Rep. II 392c-398b. There are different types o f lexis, mixed, unmixed, and a combination o f 
the two (cf.397d), but they all involve mimesis. To grasp to what degree the conception o f imitation 
and representation is important here, it is worth noting that the word mimesis and its cognates are 
employed 40 times in the section on form or expression (Rep. II 392c-398b), whereas they only 
appear twice in the section on content (Rep. II 376e-392c).
49 RepM , 392d.
’»C tR epM  393d-394b.
51 Rep.Wl 393c.
52 Although this expression is taken from die Theaetetus (176b), fins is precisely the model for 
the citizens o f the ideal city.
53 Rep.lll 394b-c.
54 Cf. Rep.m  397e.
55 Plato, of course, returns to this point in Rep.X, 605c-608b in his attack on poetry.
56 Rep.Ill 395c-e.
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perform one and only one job in order to do it well,57 this is equivalent to stating that the citizens 
in general and the guardians in particular must remain as godlike as possible that is, avoid 
transforming their proper character into that of others and exhibit only the qualities that would be 
considered suitable to their proper profession; qualities such as, in the case o f guardians, courage, 
self-control, piety, freedom.58 Since Plato feels that it is neither possible, nor desirable to eliminate 
mimésis completely, he naturally opts for the simple style o f expression which represents the good 
man.59 In sum, the poet and the myth-teller must not only imitate the expression o f the good man, 
but also conform their language to the molds regarding the gods previously prescribed.60
Now if the poets are effectively banned from the ideal state, then the founders o f the city, 
that is, the philosophers, would not only have to provide the tupoi to be followed, but equally have 
to compose the muthoi that would correspond to these.61 In sum, they would be responsible for both 
the content {logos) and the form {lexis) o f the muthoi, and in particular the muthoi with respect to 
the gods. If such is the case, this would support the thesis once again that theologia should be 
translated as a "science or rational discourse about things divine." For we now know that the 
philosophers and only the philosophers will be responsible for both the content and the form of 
muthoi, that is, "true muthoi.”62 They are true, insofar as they conform to the tupoi which, for their
57 Rep. Π 370a ff. This is the sine qua non o f the ideal state and it is reiterated in detail from 394e 
to 398b.
58 Rep.VH 395c.
59 Cf. Rep. ΙΠ 398b2. This explains why, when Adeimantus is asked to choose between three 
styles o f expression {lexis): the complex, the simple or the combination o f the two, he opts for the 
simple style which represents the good man {ton tou epieikous mimëtên akraton, 397d4-5).
60 Rep ΠΙ, 398b. O f course, the tupoi in question are the laws or principles with respect to the 
divinity mentioned above. It is worth noting that it is not by chance that Plato finishes up the section 
on mousïkë with a discussion o f harmony and rhythm (398c-400c). Harmony and rhythm along with 
words are the basic ingredients o f song, music and dance. Since song can only increase the 
effectiveness o f the imitation employed in words (401c), and since different styles o f music and 
dance are associated with different types o f character, Plato wants to ensure that the music and 
dance in his ideal state will conform to the tupoi and the goodness o f character which the citizens 
associated with them must exhibit. Much o f what we find here is developed and clarified in the
° Laws. For an interesting discussion, see G. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, Princeton, 1960,302-318
61 To ban the poets entirely entails that the members o f all three classes are obliged to follow the 
tupoi and the corresponding muthoi. A perfect example o f this is the myth o f the three metals at Rep. 
ffl,415a-d.
62 Indeed, any type of logoi, that is, literature in general.
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part, are derived from a direct apprehension o f the intelligible forms.63 64
£ . Theologia naturalis
Jaeger’s contention that Plato’s use o f the word theologia at Republic II, 379a5-6 "sprang 
from the conflict between the mythical tradition and the natural (rational) approach to the problem 
of God" appears to me to have no support in the context in question. Indeed, as Festugière^has so 
well remarked, when Plato wrote the Republic, the "concrete reality" appeared to him to be without 
any value because it was in a state o f ataxia (disorder). The sensible world was not yet integrated 
with the intelligible world. This explains why the training o f the philosopher (and, with him, the 
ideal city) was entirely dependent upon the theory o f Forms and the Form o f the Good.65 On the 
other hand, the theology found in Plato's Laws X is a perfect example o f a theologia naturalis - 
indeed, in my view, it is the first instance o f natural theology in Western philosophy.66
This is not to say that there is nothing to qualify as "natural theology" prior to Plato. I most 
certainly agree with Jaeger and those who hold that the Presocratics, as we call them, discovered, 
so to speak, nature or phusis, that is, the principle or ultimate reality behind the growth and present 
organisation o f the world,67 and that the word phusis is often used synonymously with theos or 
qualified as theia. However, although many o f the Presocratics use a rational argument or logos in 
their approach to nature (that is, substitute rational causes for mythical causes to explain the origin 
and evolution o f the present order o f things) and qualify this nature as divine, this may constitute 
theology (a rational discourse (or logos) about God or the gods, but not a natural theology.68
63 While it is true that poetry in general and myth in particular appeal to the emotional, that is the 
irrational part of
the human soul, it is still the case that the philosopher's aim is to harmonize the irrational part as 
much as possible with the spirited and rational parts o f the human soul.
64 A.J. Festugière, La Révélation de Hermès Trismégiste II, Le Dieu cosmique, Paris, 1949,98.
65 The fact that Plato could and does at times employ the word phusis to qualify the Forms and 
the intelligible world (cf. Rep.X 597b6,c2,d3,e4,598a2) has nothing to do with the case at hand. 
Indeed, although the word phusis is used to qualify the "ultimate reality," (and the intelligible world 
is, so to speak, the "ultimate reality"), the nature referred to in the expression "natural theology" is 
the "concrete reality," that is, the "physical universe."
66 For the details on this and what follows, see Gerard Naddaf, VOrigine et Révolution du concept 
grec de phusis, Lewiston, N. Y., 1992. A second revised edition o f this work is in preparation for Les 
Editions Klincksieck and an English translation for the Academia Verlag.
67 For a detailed analysis o f the word phusis, see Naddaf (1992).
68 If we are to understand by theologia naturalis or phusikos, the theory o f the nature o f the divine 
as it is revealed in the physical universe (or in the nature o f reality), the famous phrase attributed
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Plato must be considered the first to give us an authentic theologia naturalis, for he 
was the first philosopher in the Western tradition to give us not only an argument (logos) for the 
existence o f God, but an argument, or more precisely, a demonstration (apodexis or epidexis)69 70
based on arguments (logoi),70 which shows that the order and harmony exhibited in the universe and 
in particular, in the heavenly bodies reflect a divine intelligence - in sum, an argument o f the 
physico-theological or physico-teleological type.71
Until Plato, or more precisely the later Plato, it was the phusikoi who studied the meteôra, 
but these were not yet considered divine72 - whence Plato's ironical use o f the word meteorología 
and its cognates as "astronomical or high speculation."73 What is perhaps more ironical is that 
meteorología, once considered impious,74 is now considered by Plato as theologia par excellence.
to Thales that "eveiything is full o f the gods" (panta p i ere them ) would not in itself amount to a 
"natural theology". And this is also the case with Xenophanes who is often seen as confounding God 
and nature. Not only is there nothing we could genuinely qualify as "natural theology," but nothing 
that could be characterized as an argument for the existance o f God or gods. On this point, see J.H. 
Lesher, Xenophanes o f Colophon Fragments. A Text and Translation with a Commentary, Toronto, 
1992,114 ff.
69 These words and their cognates are used in this sense several times in Laws X: 887a, 892c, 
893b, 899d.
70 Plato employs the word logos several times in the plural in Laws X to qualify his own 
procedure: logoi, 887a6, 887b7,890e2, 898c9. 898d6, 899d4.
711 follow A. Lalande here for whom the two mean the same thing. C f Vocabulaire technique 
et critique de la philosophie, Paris (10th ed.), 1972, 779.
72 At least they were not considered divine by the meteörologoi in the same sense that the 
Olympic gods were considered such by the ordinary Greek.
73 Cf. Cratylus, 396c, 401b; Republic VI 488e, 489c; Phaedrus 270a, Politicus 299b, Timaeus 
9Id. In sum, astronomical research remains for Plato "high speculation" as long as it is not directed 
toward a precise end, that is, that the universe is governed by a divine intelligence which cares for 
us. Anaxagoras, o f course, is Plato's forerunner, but fell far short o f the mark (Phaedo 97b-99d) He 
is a perfect example of one who, although he studied the heavenly bodies, could not be considered 
as having developed a theologia naturalis. He is also alluded to twice in the Laws (886d,967b-c).
74 O f course I am thinking here o f Anaxagoras, but more particularly o f the decree under which 
he was condamned for impiety, that is, the famous Decree o f Diopeithes, enacted around 430 B.C. 
which authorized the prosecution of persons "who do not acknowledge (or believe in) divine matters 
(tous ta theia m ë nomizontas) or teach such theories (logous) about the heavenly bodies." Cf. 
Plutarch, Pericles 32. On Diopeithes and his decree, cf. E. Derenne, Les procès d'impiété intentés 
aux philosophes grecs à Athènes au Ve et au IVe siècles av. J. C., Liège, 1930, 19-24. It should be
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Indeed, the new theologia or rational approach to things divine is indissociable from the study of 
the structure and movements o f the heavenly bodies.
The fact that it is in Laws X and not in the Timaeus that we find the first authentic natural 
theology deserves at least a brief explanation. Indeed, one would think that in both cases what we 
have is natural theology. But in reality, the "natural theology" expounded for the first time in the 
Timaeus is radically different from what we have in Laws X. While it is true that Plato insists on the 
teleological dimension of the creationist process in the Timaeus?5 the events which led to the 
present order o f things, including, as is well understood, the structure and movements o f the 
heavenly bodies, are expounded in the form of a "likely story" {eikös muthos or eikös logos).16
There are at least three reasons for which Plato qualifies Timaeus's account of the production 
of the world as "likely story." First, the Timaeus is a cosmogonical account which describes the 
production of the sensible world (whereas in Laws X, we have a description o f the world as it is, a 
cosmology) and, since the sensible world is only a changing copy (eikön) o f a model {paradeigma), 
its description can only be provisory and likely {eikös). Second, since the state o f the world before 
and during its production escapes any direct or even indirect perception, Timaeus can only "imitate" 
in the order of discourse what appears to him to have been the procedure o f the Demiurge.75 67 Third, 
it is likely in the sense that the cosmogonical accounts of his adversaries, the theologoi and the
noted that Plato makes a direct reference to this decree and indeed shows his contempt for it at Laws 
821a.
75 The Timaeus is part of trilogy which explains the origin and evolution o f the present order of 
things from a teleological point of view. As such, it is the first historia peri phuseös o f the 
teleological type, as opposed to the evolutionary type, which was common to most, if  not all, o f the 
Presocratic philosophers and which originated in the old cosmogonical myths whose aim was 
likewise to explain the origin and evolution of the present order o f things. The substitution by the 
Presocratics of rational (i.e., natural) for supernatural causes to explain this order reinforced, as 
Plato was well aware, the sophistic contention that law, morality, and even the gods were not 
absolute entities. The aim o f Plato's historia is to refute those predecessors and to show that law, 
morality, and the gods (i.e., heavenly bodies) exist by nature (phusei) and not by convention 
(.nomöi). For a more detailed account, as well as how this is connected with the famous Atlantis 
story, see Naddaf ( 1992) and more recently, G. Naddaf, "The Atlantis Myth: An Introduction to 
Plato's Later Phi losophy o f History," Phoenix,A%, 1994, 189-209.
76 For a more detailed analysis o f these expressions in the Timaeus and their relation with Laws 
X, see Naddaf (1992), 370-374. I do not share the opinion of those who hold like Comford that the 
Timaeus is, for Plato, a muthos because "no account o f the material world can ever amount to an 
exact and self-consistent statement o f an unchangeable truth." {Plato’s Cosmology, London, 1937, 
31 ). Indeed, if  such were the case, the logos employed in Laws X would equally be a muthos and 
this, as we shall see, is clearly not the case.
77 On the role o f mimésis, cf. P. Hadot, "Physique et poésie dans le Timée de Platon," Revue de 
théologie et de philosophie 115, 1985, 113-133.
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phusikoi, are not likely, for they confounded ’’true causes" with "subordinate causes."
It is important to note that in all three cases the production of the world described in the 
Timaeus must be considered as a "non-verifiable" discourse.78 However, this is not the only problem 
for the case at hand. None of Plato’s predecessors and adversaries would have accepted the principle 
of a Demiurge and the world o f intelligible Forms. Indeed, in the Timaeus account, it is a Demiurge 
who organized the spatial medium by fixing his eyes on the intelligible models to produce the 
sensible copies o f which the universe is composed. Plato must, therefore, demonstrate with 
arguments, acceptable to all, that the universe exhibits order and harmony and that it is consequently 
"divine" without recourse to a Demiurge and an intelligible world o f Forms.
In Laws X Plato evokes the cause o f what he sees as the collapse o f the society o f his tim e.79 
The origin o f this cause is found in the works o f the peri phuseös type, which uphold that law, 
morality and even the gods are products o f "human conventions." Since the gods for Plato are the 
only true guarantors of the city and its laws, one must, at any price, try to prove their existence but 
not, once again, by means of a likely (albeit non-verifiable) story, but by means o f a demonstration 
based on arguments acceptable to all.
Before beginning this demonstration Plato briefly explains the position o f his adversaries, 
in the form o f a peri phuseös account, that is, an account which explains and describes how the 
present order o f things, that is, world, humanity, and society, originated and developed from its 
primordial state.80 According to his adversaries, whom he considers as atheistic materialists, the
78 In their book Inventer l'univers. Le problème de la connaissance et les modèles cosmologiques, 
Paris, 1991, L. Brisson and W. Meyerstein hold that Plato's account in the Timaeus is the first true 
"scientific" account in the sense that Plato employs there for the first time what was to become the 
method employed for any research which pretends to be scientific: a list o f axioms and rules of 
inference. Further, Plato, again in the Timaeus, was the first to employ mathematics as the 
instrument for the expression and deduction o f the postulated axioms. This explains, according to 
Brisson and Meyerstein, why Plato is the inventor o f the method which is behind the success of 
modem science. Indeed, science for our two authors is indissociable from a formal axiomatized 
system. Furthermore, they maintain, indeed it is their central thesis, that the gap between theory 
and experience is so deep that no immediate data originating in the sensible world can modify the 
fact that the theory itself is always based on an ideal construction, on a set of irreducible and 
nondemonstrable axioms. In sum, it is impossible to have more than a "likely account" of the 
sensible world. This, as we shall see, is precisely the antithesis o f what we find in Laws X. For a 
more detailed account and critique o f their position, see my review o f their book in Phoenix, 49, 
1995,83-86.
79 For a detailed account of what follows see Naddaf, 1992,474-522.
80 It is interesting to note here that Plato’s aim is not only to refute modem works o f the peri 
phuseös type, but equally the older works o f the peri phuseös type like Hesiod's Theogony. Indeed, 
both the old (hoi menplaiotatoi,886c3) and the new accounts (ta de tön neón, 886d3) suppose that 
the gods o f worship (whether conventional or not) appear after the birth o f the universe. For Hesiod, 
cf. 886c. For for the modems, o f course, the gods exist techné and not phusei (889e). Since the
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present order of things emerged by chance (tuchei) from four primary inanimate (apsucha) elements 
or principles: earth, air, fire, and water. This is what the materialists understand by phusis as arche.
In order to demonstrate that the gods exist and are the true guarantors for the state and its 
laws, Plato has recourse to versions o f two81 famous arguments: the cosmological and the physico- 
theological.82 Plato employs the cosmological argument to show that the soul {psuchê), which his 
adversaries held to be a product posterior to the four elements, is in fact prior. For if  one 
understands by phusis the primary source o f generation for all things, then the soul has a better claim 
to be qualified as phusis - at least moreso than the four apsucha - for soul is movement which moves 
itself and only such a movement can be the primary source of generation; for it is prior, in existence 
and in dignity, to the series of movements transmitted by bodies. Indeed, soul is the ultimate cause 
o f all bodily motion. Consequently, if  the universe really was generated (something all his 
predecessors maintained), it is impossible, according to Plato's argument, that the present order of 
things was able to emerge from its initial state without the initial impetus o f a moving principle, a 
principle which is identified with phusis as arche and which, if  it were to cease to act, would bring 
about the end o f the universe.83 In sum, without soul, the primordial state o f things would forever 
remain at rest.
However, this first argument is not sufficient, since soul is not the supreme principle Plato 
has in mind when he thinks o f God. Soul is neutral and hence can be good or bad according to the 
circumstances. Now since God is by definition good, Plato must determine which principle will 
assure, in a permanent way, the goodness o f soul. This principle is obviously nous (intelligence), 
which is exhibited in the harmony it establishes and maintains in the natural world.
This, however, remains to be demonstrated and this is precisely the aim o f the physico- 
theological argument. This demonstration depends essentially on one thing: its ability to prove that 
the movements o f the heavenly bodies are o f the same nature as those o f nous, that is, circular, 
uniform and constant.84 But how does one go about this? Plato supposes that a simple observation 
of the heavenly bodies will suffice to convince one that their movements and those o f the intellect 
are identical and, consequently, that it is the anstêpsuchê which is in control. However, in reality, 
it is much more complex. The observation of the sky (i.e., observational astronomy) reveals that
substance of Laws X is to refute not only the phusikoi, but also the theologoi, it is rather surprising 
the Jaeger began with Republic Π, which does not mention either the theologoi or the phusikoi in 
this context, although they are critical to the argument o f his introductory chapter.
81 Plato is perfectly conscious that he employs two different, but mutually dependent arguments, 
to prove the gods exist (du'eston töperi theön agonte, 966d6). Cf. Laws ΧΠ 966d-967d.
82 Indeed, he may be considered as their initiator.
83 Laws X  895a5-bl.
84 Laws X 897c. Cf. 898a-b. Plato takes this a simile from a previous classification o f movements 
at 893d.
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some o f the heavenly bodies appear to wander. Mathematical astronomy, on the other hand, can 
show that the heavenly bodies that, until then, were considered wanderers, move in circular fashion, 
i.e., intelligently. This could be shown by successfully demonstrating that each planet has a 
geometric trajectory which conforms to the movements determined by observational astronomy.85 
This may veiy well explain why Plato now considers astronomy as "noble, true, beneficial to society 
and completely acceptable to God"86 and in the Epinomis, a dialogue with a strong Platonic 
overtone, as the most noble science o f all.87 It sounds as though astronomy now replaces dialectic 
as the supreme science. Indeed, it is thanks to astronomy that the physico-theological argument 
proves that the soul which animates the heavenly bodies is necessarily good, something the 
cosmological argument could not successfully prove. In sum, astronomy confirms the conviction 
o f those who believed that the universe as a whole is the product o f a rational design.
Once Plato completes his demonstration, he can affirm, as he did in the Timaeus, that the 
rule o f  life consists in imitating, as perfectly as possible, the sensible model which the world 
represents for him. In brief, the human soul must imitate the movements o f the World Soul, which 
manifest themselves to us under the form of those perfectly circular and uniform movements which 
are those o f the heavenly bodies: the visible gods.88
F. Conclusion
While it true to say that the context in which Plato uses the word theologia in the Republic 
Π 379a5 leaves little doubt that it could and should be translated as "science o f things divine," the 
theology in question has nothing to do with theologia naturalis. Indeed, the rational discourse 
(logos) about God or the gods in the Republic is indissociable from an analysis o f the intelligible 
Forms relative to God. Further, the sensible world is still seen as being in a state o f ataxia and, 
therefore, something that should be shunned, not worshipped. On the other hand, in Laws X Plato 
has no recourse to either a Demiurge or to the intelligible world o f Forms. The argumentation he 
employs to prove the existence o f God or the gods (i.e., the heavenly bodies) is wholly empirical, 
for it is based on an analysis o f motion in the sensible world.89 And this, in my view, is what
85 For the relation between theory and observation in astronomy, cf. R.B. Goldstein, Theory and 
Observation in Ancient and Medieval Astronomy, London, 1985.
86 Laws V n 821b.
87 Epinomis 990a.
88 Plato summarizes his two arguments at Laws XII 966d-967e. Although a similar conclusion 
is reached in the Timaeus (90c-d), it is not, once again, based on argument.
89 Indeed, he tells us himself that his proof would not have been possible without an alliance 
between the senses (notably sight) and the intellect. Cf. Laws XII 961d-e. To show to what degree 
Plato has come full circle with respect to the senses, it should be noted that the lessons o f history 
and experience are the primary factors behind his conception o f the new constitution o f the Laws.
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qualifies Plato as the father o f theologia naturalis.
In fact, at Laws X II95 lb, he tells us that a state that insists on keeping to itself, refusing any contact 
with others, will never attain an advanced level o f civilisation. Further, it is worth noting that the 
language employed by Plato in Laws X to describe the destiny o f soul after death is equally wholly 
empirical. Indeed, not only is there no reference to a world o f intelligible Forms or any type of 
metamorphosis, but it is said that human psuchai, on death, will automatically float to the region 
(itopos, 903d7,904b8,d2,d8,e 1,905bl ) of "physical space" (chöra) which corresponds to their 
character (903d-905c). This is the case we are told because everything is arranged in view o f the 
interest of the whole (903b-d).
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